WASHINGTON - Al-Qaida "wannabes" is how two researchers at
the Washington Institute
wine boxfor Near East Policy describe jihadi groups in the Gaza Strip that identify with Osama bin Laden's organization. But according to the researchers, Al-Qaida is in no hurry to recognize these groups as its affiliates, despite its support for Palestinian jihad.
The paper, written by Matthew Levitt and former deputy head of the Shin Bet security service Yoram Cohen, is entitled "Deterred but Determined." It argues that Al-Qaida is not convinced that the Palestinian groups are ideologically committed to global jihad. Moreover, it is unconvinced that they can survive in the long run, and fears that Israeli intelligence could penetrate their ranks.
Al-Qaida's reputation has suffered from "killing more Muslims than non-Muslims every year," but "they can still do very sophisticated things," Levitt said. "They cannot dilute a branding and it's a very clear priority of theirs. There is a little advantage to them to bring [in] unproven affiliates."
Thus so far, he said, the most Al-Qaida has been willing to do is let these groups publish occasional statements on its affiliated Web sites
wicker basket. But should one of them "successfully target [Quartet envoy] Tony Blair" or get a booby-trapped truck inside Israel, "the situation will have changed."
Even before Hamas took over Gaza, polls showed more support for Al-Qaida there than in the West Bank. In 2004, for instance, only 7 percent of Gazans defined Al-Qaida as a terrorist organization, and in 2005, 65 percent of Gazans supported Al-Qaida attacks on Western targets.
Initially, Al-Qaida supported Hamas, but later, the researchers said
wine box, the relationship soured due to Al-Qaida's suspicion of Hamas' political efforts - such as running in the Palestinian Authority elections - and its ties with the governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which Al-Qaida loathes.
Intelligence agencies believe the hard core of Gaza's jihadi groups numbers 200 to 300 people. These groups swear allegiance first and foremost not to the Palestinian national cause, but to the Muslim nation, and they crave recognition by Al-Qaida. The study quotes one jihadi leader in Gaza, for instance, as saying, "We are waiting to carry out a big jihadist operation dedicated to Sheikh Osama bin Laden ... If Al-Qaida asks us to pledge allegiance to it, we are completely ready for it."
According to Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer who is now a senior researcher at the Brookings Institute's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, most Gazan jihadis are former Hamas members who have grown disappointed with that group, along with foreign extremists who have infiltrated via Egypt. Levitt agrees. Groups such Jaish al-Umma, Jaish al-Islam and Jaish Ansar Allah, he said, have no interest in expanding significantly; they prefer a hard core of committed activists capable of carrying out high-profile attacks.
But despite their small numbers, he added, these groups are cause for concern. First, Al-Qaida could opt to devote more resources to this region. And second, Hamas is not really managing to combining politics with jihad, so it will ultimately have to choose one or the other.
In the West Bank, due to Fatah's political control and the Israel army presence, there are only a handful of isolated jihadi cells, but jihadi preaching is common. And jihadi extremism could spread to Israeli Arabs, the researchers warned, if economic gaps between Jews and Arabs continue to widen and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved.
Jihadi extremism could spread in Gaza as well, they said
wine box, due to both disappointment with Hamas and the indoctrination Gazans receive in Hamas schools - especially if the border with Egypt remains porous, allowing foreign extremists to continue infiltrating. And while the combination of Gaza's sealed border with Israel and Hamas' ruthlessness toward groups
wicker basketthat do not accept its rule limits the jihadis' ability to carry out attacks, their motivation is high, the researchers warned.
